Journal of Civil Law Studies
Volume 8
Number 1 Les unions (il)légalement reconnues:
approches internationales
(Il)legally Recognized Unions: International
Approaches
La Roche-sur-Yon (France)

Article 13

10-5-2015

An Analysis in Empathy: Why Compassion Need Not Be Exiled
from the Province of Judging Same-Gender Marriage Cases
Kacie Gray

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls
Part of the Civil Law Commons

Repository Citation
Kacie Gray, An Analysis in Empathy: Why Compassion Need Not Be Exiled from the Province of Judging
Same-Gender Marriage Cases, 8 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol8/iss1/13

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

AN ANALYSIS IN EMPATHY: WHY COMPASSION NEED
NOT BE EXILED FROM THE PROVINCE OF JUDGING
SAME-GENDER MARRIAGE CASES
Kacie F. Gray∗
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 243
II. United States v. Windsor: A Love Story ................................ 246
III. Muddling In Louisiana.......................................................... 249
A. Robicheaux v. Caldwell: Abandoning the “Pageant of
Empathy” ................................................................................ 249
B. Costanza v. Caldwell: The Intact, Same-Gender Family
................................................................................................ 254
IV. Baskin v. Bogan: Sardonicism in the Seventh Circuit .......... 258
V. Conclusion ............................................................................. 262

I. INTRODUCTION
When the methods of decision-making point in different
directions, Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo tells us that no one
decision-making “formula” should be followed. “If you ask how
[the judge] is to know when one interest outweighs the other, I can
only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator
gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life
itself.” 1 What Justice Cardozo did not explicitly say, however, is
∗ J.D., Paul M. Hébert Law Center, Louisiana State University (2015).
This note was written prior to the judgment delivered on June 26, 2015, by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), ruling that
the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
1. Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-113
(1921).
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that beyond experience, study, and reflection reside empathy and
compassion. In formulating judgments, the court’s angle of vision
makes all the difference.
The law is rooted in the ethical treatment of persons, and the
underlying basis of ethics is empathy. 2 In the absence of empathy
the law is merely a tool for rationalization, and fails to act as an
instrument for social justice. There is, however, a widely held—but
fallacious—belief
in
the
“purely
objective
ruling.”
Incontrovertibly, each decision implicitly reflects the bias that each
judge carries. Such bias expresses itself as the inclination to give
the “benefit of the doubt” to those with whom they identify and to
be skeptical of those with whom they share little mutuality.
Nevertheless, while judges’ decisions must be in accord with the
Constitution, it is essential that they have a sense of empathy such
that the law may accomplish its ultimate purpose—to preserve
human dignity.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s jurisprudence has been marked
by a similar insight. Judging is much more than a process of
pristine deductive analysis. Compassion, wisdom, and common
sense are as essential to the judicial role as scholarship and
technical mastery of the law. 3 Expressing this notion in his
opinions, Justice Blackmun acknowledges the inevitable
limitations of judges while also exposing the cruel reality of the
law as a mathematical application of legal “axioms and
corollaries” that “ignores the consideration of its impact on the
lives of real people.” 4 In his separate dissent in DeShaney v.
2. Arthur Dorbin, Why the Law Can't Do Without Compassion (Aug. 23,
2011), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/am-i-right/201108/why-the-lawcant-do-without-compassion (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
3. William H. Rehnquist, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Byron R. White, Richard Arnold, A.M. Keith, Paul R. Baier, Allan Gates, Erwin
N. Griswold, Edward Lazarus, Norval Morris, Gregg Orwoll, Estelle H. Rogers,
Herman Schwartz, Nina Totenberg, & Sarah Weddington, A Tribute to Justice
Harry A. Blackmun: “The Kind Voice of Friends.”, 43:3 AM. U.L. REV. 687-753
(Spring 1994).
4. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 5 Justice
Blackmun scolds the majority for purporting to be the
dispassionate oracle of the law, unmoved by “natural sympathy.” 6
Justice Blackmun observes that the Court's precedents left
questions unanswered and, in response, suggests a “sympathetic”
reading of the Due Process Clause: “One which comports with
dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion
need not be exiled from the province of judging.” 7
Same-gender marriage is a socially diversory topic, and the
controversy surrounding it finds prominent expression in law,
politics, and personal beliefs. 8 The inextricable nature of samegender marriage encompasses matters of family structure, gender
roles, justice, and equality. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which resides at the forefront of the
proponents’ arguments, guarantees that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The
Supreme Court of the United States dedicates a considerable
amount of time to itemizing specific liberties protected by this
guarantee, including those related to marriage. Crucially, in Loving
v. Virginia 9 the Supreme Court held that states could not ban
interracial marriage since “the freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 10 To “deny this
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes,” Chief Justice Earl
Warren writes, is “directly subversive of the principle of equality

5. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
212 (1989). (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 212.
7. Id. at 213.
8. Justin Reinheimer, Same Sex Marriage Through the Equal Protection
Clause: A Gender-Conscious Analysis, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 213
(2006).
9. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
10. Id. at 13.
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at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 11 Thus, “under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by
the State.” 12
Where political discourse surrounding same-gender marriage
has become convoluted by religion and arguments of morality, the
legal treatment of same-gender marriage under a sympathetic
reading of the Due Process Clause holds the potential to provide a
more direct path to the legalization of same-gender marriage.
II. UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR: A LOVE STORY
The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in United States v.
Windsor 13 significantly altered the legal landscape for same-gender
marriage in the United States. 14 The Supreme Court held Section 3
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional as a
violation of equal protection pursuant to the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. As a result of this landmark decision,
marriages performed in those states recognizing same-gender
marriages were to be treated equally for purposes of federal law.
Windsor involves the individual, the institution, and competing
points of view. From one point of view there is the individual
plaintiff, Edith Windsor, and the love story of her same-gender
marriage. From the other point of view, the case is about
institutional power and the conflict between federal and state
definitions of marriage. In a broader sense, the case is a reflection
of the constant tension between the rights of the individual versus
the “best interests” of the government, and the perpetual conflict
regarding the division of political power between the state and the
federal government.
11. Id. at 12.
12. Id.
13. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
14. DOMA (Pub.L. 104–199, enacted Sep. 21, 1996) defines “marriage” as
union between a man and a woman, and “spouse” to refer to a person of the
opposite sex.
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Thea Spyer and her surviving spouse, Edith Windsor, were
married under Canadian law, a marriage recognized by the state of
New York. After the death of Thea Spyer, Edith Windsor was
denied the benefit of a spousal estate tax exemption under the
DOMA. In bringing suit against the federal government for a
refund of federal estate taxes paid, Edith Windsor challenged the
constitutionality of DOMA. Although the Department of Justice
refused to defend the statute, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
(BLAG) intervened in the litigation to defend DOMA’s
constitutionality.
The complaint filed by Edith Windsor in the Southern District
of New York focused on “Edie and Thea.” 15 Edie and Thea’s love
story spans four pages of the complaint, while a description of
DOMA required only one page of the response. The story begins
with the following excerpt:
Edie and Thea’s life stories are in one sense remarkable for
the extraordinary times through which they lived, and at the
same time quite typical of the lives of gay men and lesbians
of their generations given the pervasive discrimination and
homophobia that Edie and Thea encountered on a routine
basis. Yet despite obstacles nearly unimaginable today to
the generations of gay men and lesbians who followed in
their wake, Edie and Thea went on to live lives of great joy,
full of dancing, love, and celebration. 16
When a protagonist like Edith Windsor drives the story of the
opinion, the emotion invoked by her character becomes the
impetus that energizes and commands the reader. Scholarship
indicates that narratives “influence beliefs and attitudes by
encouraging empathetic and emotional connections with story
characters.” 17 Having a character in the opinion allows the reader
to distance himself from any existing preconceptions and to
15. Complaint at 2, Windsor v. U.S., 833 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(No. 1:10CV08435).
16. Complaint at 5, Windsor v. U.S., id.
17. Phillip J. Mazzocco & Melanie C. Green, Narrative Persuasion in Legal
Settings: What’s the Story?, 23:1 THE JURY EXPERT (May 2011).

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

248

[Vol. 8

empathize with the narrative of the story. Identifiable characters
facilitate the “receiver’s identification with and potential empathy
for the characters” because the readers “vicariously experience
characters’ beliefs and emotions, empathize with them, and
become engrossed in the story.” 18
In discussing the Defense of Marriage Act, the Windsor Court
continuously links the impact of the Federal statute to all persons,
including Edie Windsor. In examining the relationship between the
federal and state powers to define marriage, the Court explains that
DOMA’s impact on the individual: “Diminishes the stability and
predictability of the basic personal relations the State has found it
proper to acknowledge and protect.” 19
Justice Kennedy writes, “The federal statute is invalid, for no
legitimate purpose overcomes the effect to disparage and to injure
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity.” 20 Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy reasons:
DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of statesanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The
principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other
reasons like governmental efficiency. . . Responsibilities, as
well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity of the
person.... By this dynamic, DOMA undermines both the
public and private significance of state-sanctioned samegender marriages; for it tells those couples, and all the
world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of
federal recognition . . . . 21
When the federal government treats heterosexual marriages
differently than those state-sanctioned same-gender marriages, the
court holds that the Constitution prevents the distinction. “Such a

18. Min Kyung Lee, Story of Birth and Funeral: Rhetorical Analysis of
Windsor and Shelby County, Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-372
(February 2014), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393634.
19. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2720 (2013).
20. Id. at 2696.
21. Id. at 2681.
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differentiation,” Justice Kennedy exclaims, “demean[s] the couple,
whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects.” 22
Though the word “dignity” cannot be found in the language of
the Constitution, Justice Kennedy uses it no fewer than ten times in
his majority opinion. Justice Kennedy emphasizes human dignity
as a constitutional value; one that stands at the heart of the Court’s
longstanding commitment to equal protection. In refusing to
engage in a solely methodical and dispassionate analysis, the Court
situates itself to deliver an opinion that contemplates human
dignity, compassion, and the impact on the lives of very real
people, including those children affected by the decision.
“DOMA,” Justice Kennedy writes, “humiliates tens of
thousands of children now being raised by same-gender couples.
The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to
understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and the
concords of daily life.” 23 Justice Kennedy describes the anticipated
harms of DOMA, beyond those financial consequences, and
contemplates a clear identification of the victims of the Defense of
Marriage Act and their suffering. In rendering an opinion that takes
cognizance of these consequences, arguably, Justice Kennedy
recognizes that the right to same-gender marriage is implicit in the
Constitution. Nevertheless, underlying tones of federalism in the
opinion have caused some confusion in lower courts.
III. MUDDLING IN LOUISIANA
A. Robicheaux v. Caldwell: Abandoning the “Pageant of
Empathy”
The same-gender marriage situation in Louisiana has now
become somewhat muddled, among recent conflicting rulings by
different courts—one federal, one state. Judge Martin Leach-Cross
Feldman of the Eastern District of Louisiana was the first federal
22. Id. at 2675.
23. Id. at 2694.
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judge to uphold a state prohibition against same-gender marriage
since the landmark decision striking down the Defense of Marriage
Act in Windsor. 24
The petitioners in Robicheaux v. Caldwell 25 include seven
Louisiana same-gender couples, several of whom are raising
children, and the Forum For Equality, a statewide organization
whose members include Louisiana same-gender couples and their
families. The petitioners allege that Louisiana’s constitutional ban
on same-gender marriage forbids them access to the status, rights,
and protections of marriage; disparages their families; and inflicts
harms on their children. Such a ban, they argue, denies petitioners
who are unmarried the right to marry within the state and denies
petitioners who have legally married outside of the state all legal
recognition of their marriages. The descriptions of each petitioner
are limited to, at most, four to five lines of the complaint. In brief,
they argue that Louisiana’s marriage ban infringes upon their
constitutional right to due process and equal protection and,
accordingly, that the ban should be struck down.
While most federal judges responsible for striking down samegender marriage prohibitions incorporate arguments of love,
equality, empathy, and compassion into their opinions, Judge
Feldman’s opinion provides an unadulterated contrast. In
upholding Louisiana’s prohibition on same-gender marriage, Judge
Feldman concludes that same-gender couples have no
“fundamental right to marry” and that Louisiana’s Constitutional
amendment 26 should be judged by the lowest standard of judicial
scrutiny, rational basis. 27
In his nearly thirty-two page opinion, Judge Feldman exiles
compassion from his judgment and fails to employ a sympathetic
reading of the Due Process Clause, as advocated by Justice Harry
24.
25.
26.
27.

Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910 (E.D. La. 2014).
Id.
La. Const. Art. XII, § 15.
Robicheaux v. Caldwell, supra note 24.
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A. Blackmun. Judge Feldman dispassionately argues that being
homosexual is a choice, compares same-gender marriage to incest
and polygamy, and, most offensively, labels same-gender marriage
as “inconceivable.” 28 “No authority dictates,” Feldman writes,
“that same-gender marriage is anchored to history or tradition. The
concept of same-gender marriage is ‘a new perspective, a new
insight,’ nonexistent and even inconceivable until very recently
....” 29 Despite the fact that the majority of federal courts are
currently striking down same-gender marriage bans, Judge
Feldman explicitly disagrees. “The federal court decisions,”
Feldman wrote “thus far exemplify a pageant of empathy;
decisions impelled by a response of innate pathos . . . . It would no
doubt be celebrated to be in the company of the near-unanimity of
the many other federal courts that have spoken to this pressing
issue, if this court were confident in the belief that those cases
provide a correct guide.” 30
Judge Feldman’s opinion goes beyond that of legal analysis
and delivers a demoralizing and personal insult to marriage
equality proponents. In invoking his “moral slippery slope”
argument, Judge Feldman implies that expanding the definition of
marriage to include same-gender couples might “open the door” to
the legalization of incest and polygamy—two behaviors explicitly
prohibited by existing law. In proffering the following questions,
Judge Feldman grossly mischaracterizes same-gender marriage and
implies that such a right is distinct and inferior to the fundamental
right of marriage enjoyed by heterosexual couples:
Must the states permit or recognize a marriage between an
aunt and niece? Aunt and nephew? Brother/brother? Father
and child? May minors marry? Must marriage be limited to
only two people? . . . Such unions would undeniably be
equally committed to love and caring for one another, just
28. Id. at 926.
29. Id. at 923 (citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2689) (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 925.
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like the plaintiffs. 31
At no point in Loving v. Virginia, 32 however, did the Supreme
Court engage in such an attenuated, impertinent analysis of
whether allowing interracial couples the right to marry would lead
to such obscure consequences, notwithstanding the illegality of
interracial sexual relations at that time in history. In Lawrence v.
Texas, Justice Kennedy indicated that private, consensual sexual
intimacy between two adult persons of the same gender may not be
punished by the State, and it can form “but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring.” 33
Misapplying the language of the majority in Windsor, Judge
Feldman relies upon the first portion of Justice Kennedy’s opinion
that speaks to the states’ power to define marriage. 34 The States’
interest in defining and regulating the marital relation, subject to
constitutional guarantees, proceeds from the understanding that
marriage is more than a routine classification for purposes of
certain statutory benefits. Relying on Windsor as a shield, Judge
Feldman writes:
This court finds it difficult to minimize, indeed, ignore, the
high court’s powerful reminder in Windsor: ‘The definition
of marriage is the foundation of the State’s broader
authority to regulate the subject of domestic relations with
respect to the protection of offspring, property interests,
and the enforcement of marital responsibilities . . . The
whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and
not to the laws of the United States. 35
Judge Feldman blatantly takes portions of the Windsor decision
out of context and errs in disregarding the second portion of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion, which reiterates that state laws must respect
31. Id. at 926.
32. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
33. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 567 (2003).
34. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
35. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, supra note 24, at 918 (citing In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593).
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the constitutional rights of persons, and that same-gender marriage
bans offend the basic principles of equality.
Greatly persuaded by the argument that same-gender marriage
should be a product of the democratic process, Judge Feldman
lends legitimacy to the disposition of social issues by prevailing
popular opinion and agrees that, “fundamental social change . . . is
better cultivated through democratic consensus.” 36
Relying upon a dissenting opinion from the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Judge Feldman invokes the words of Judge Paul
J. Kelley which, he claims, “ought not be slighted”:
[W]here, as here, the language of the applicable provision
provides great leeway and where the underlying social
policies are felt to be of vital importance, the temptation to
read personal preference into the Constitution is
understandably great . . . . But it is not the business of this
Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious
regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes
the Court’s giving effect to its own notions of what is wise
or politic. 37
Classical legal scholar John Chipman Gray would argue,
instead, that the limits of jurisprudence include not only subject
matter, but also a consideration what the law should be. “The
opinions of judges on matters of ethics and policy,” Gray argues,
“are the ‘chief engines’ of legal development.” 38 Thus, emotion is
and ought to be understood as part of the legal process, and not as
merely a “personal preference.” In accepting a judge’s use of
discretion we must understand who the judge is. This
understanding includes his sociological, political, ideological, and
psychological aspects; none of which can be thought of
independently of emotion. 39 In the case of same-gender marriage,
36. Id. at 918.
37. Id. at 926 (citing Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (2014)).
38. Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of
Classical Legal Thought, 88:5 IOWA L. REV. (August 2001).
39. RENATA GROSSI, LOOKING FOR LOVE IN THE LEGAL DISCOURSE OF
MARRIAGE 4-5 (ANU Press 2014).
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however, love is a human experience, not a political statement for
which Judge Feldman’s own notion is required.
Beyond Judge Martin Feldman’s exile of empathy from
judgment lies another aspect of the case that, arguably, contributes
to its adverse outcome. Like the same-gender cases that preceded
it, the plaintiffs in Robicheaux are several. While it is true that the
consolidation of cases may act as a mechanism for legal
expediency, it does so to the detriment of the parties. The result is
a dilution of the personal narrative. The personal stories of the
plaintiffs, which are critical in invoking empathy and compassion,
become lost amongst the legal argument. As a result, the narrative
is uneven and judges like Martin Feldman, then, are less likely to
empathize with a seemingly unidentifiable main character. Because
the interests at stake are so closely tied to the personal lives of each
character affected, it is imperative that marriage equality
proponents place the story of the individual at the forefront of their
arguments.
B. Costanza v. Caldwell: The Intact, Same-Gender Family
In a Louisiana state court action, Costanza v. Caldwell
(2014), 40 Judge Edward Rubin of the Fifteenth Judicial District
Court overturned Louisiana’s ban on same-gender marriage in
declaring the law unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of Fourteenth Amendment, as well as
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Judge Rubin ordered state
officials to recognize the marriage of a lesbian couple, Angela
Costanza and Chastity Brewer; to officially approve their adoption
of a boy, N.B., born in 2004; and to allow the couple to file a joint
state income tax return.
The case involves a same-gender couple (Costanza and
Brewer) married in California in 2008, who petitioned the state of
40. Costanza v. Caldwell, No. 2013-0052 D2. (LA 15th JDC, Sept. 22,
2014).
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Louisiana to have their marriage recognized and to allow Mrs.
Costanza to adopt the biological child of Mrs. Brewer through an
intra-family adoption. In denying their request, the State notes that
same-gender marriage is expressly prohibited under Louisiana
law. 41 In their petition, Costanza and Brewer argue that by
forbidding same-gender couples to marry and adopt, the state of
Louisiana violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because such a prohibition denies same-gender
couples those rights afforded to similarly-situated heterosexual
couples. The petitioners also argue that Louisiana’s failure to
recognize their marriage and its refusal to grant the intra-family
adoption of their ten-year old son, N.B., deprives them of their
fundamental right to marry and raise their child in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Judge Rubin in Costanza, like Justice Kennedy in Windsor,
utilizes the symbolic meaning of children in creating the personal
narrative and crafting a persuasive argument. The three means of
effecting persuasion, according to Aristotle, are to understand
emotions, to name them and describe them, and to know their
causes and the way in which they are excited. 42 If the reader is
sympathetic to those negatively affected by Louisiana’s ban on
same-gender marriage, such as young N.B., they are generally
more agreeable to the court’s determination of the ban as
unconstitutional. Moral emotions, including sympathy, are highly
correlated and related to vulnerability. In the case of same-gender
marriage, the most readily identifiable and vulnerable victims are
the children.
Contradicting Judge Feldman, Judge Rubin dismisses the
state’s proposition that the ban on same-gender marriage has a
rational relationship to its goals of linking children with their
biological parents. In evidencing that Louisiana allows adoptions
by foster parents, Judge Rubin reasons that it would be “illogical”
41. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15.
42. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, BOOK 1, at 8.
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to say that intact families are only those formed by a child's
biological parents. “There can be no distinction between linking
children to ‘intact families,’ formed by their biological parents and
linking children to already intact families 43 involving same-gender
marriages, such as the Costanza-Brewer family.” 44 Finding that the
petitioners are best positioned to make familial decisions regarding
the custody and care of their young child, N.B., Judge Rubin
declares that the result of holding otherwise would constitute an
infringement upon Chastity and Angela’s liberty interest in raising
their child, as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 45 In his last remarks relating to the
adoption of young N.B., Judge Rubin explains that while the
children of same-gender couples may only have biological ties to
one parent, “Biological relationships are not the exclusive
determinant of the existence of a family.” 46
In addition to possessing the requisite legal expertise, Judge
Rubin displays a compassionate recognition of how legal decisions
impact the lives of ordinary people, particularly those involved in
same-gender marriages. While the last eight pages of the opinion
contain a mechanical recitation of the relied upon jurisprudence,
Judge Rubin devotes a considerable portion of the opinion to
affirming that the right sought by same-gender couples is not a
new right, but merely the fundamental right to marry that is
similarly enjoyed by heterosexual couples. In contrast, by denying
the applicability of Loving v. Virginia 47 to Robicheaux, Judge
Feldman scornfully treats the notion of same-gender marriage as
43. In his reasons for opinion, Judge Edward Rubin chooses to include
parentheticals around “intact family” when it precedes a description of a heteronormative family. When describing a family structure, whose composure is that
of a same-gender couple, the words “intact family” are not surrounded by
parentheticals. It would appear, here, that Judge Rubin’s grammar choice is
purposeful; highlighting that the scope of intact families includes both hetero
and homosexual couples.
44. Costanza v. Caldwell, supra note 40, at 18.
45. Id. at 19.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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“inconceivable,” non-traditional, and secondary to the fundamental
right of marriage afforded to heterosexual couples—depriving
those same-gender couples of their dignity. By comparison, relying
upon the majority opinion in Kitchen, 48 Judge Rubin explains that
the relevant question presented in Loving 49 is not whether
interracial marriage is deeply rooted in tradition, or whether
interracial marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
Rather, he submits that the relevant right at issue in Loving is “the
freedom to marry.” 50
Judge Rubin’s empathetic opinion recognizes that although the
right to same-gender marriage is not deeply rooted in tradition, a
history of discrimination against homosexuals is ever present:
Lest we forget, there was a time in America’s history when
gays and lesbians were not permitted to even associate in
public….We are past that now, but when it comes to
marriage between persons of the same sex, this nation is
moving towards acceptance that years ago would have
never been contemplated. 51
Compassion in the province of judging becomes increasingly
important to address the issues of stigma and discriminatory
attitudes:
There are those that might argue that gays and lesbians can
be treated differently, and yet be considered to be equal
among the rest of Americans. [B]ut . . . fortunately for this
country, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with the
case of Brown v. Board of Education, 52 which overruled
48. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014). In 2013,
three same-gender couples (Derek Kitchen and Moudi Sbeity, Karen Archer and
Kate Call, and Laurie Wood and Kody Partridge) filed suit challenging Utah’s
ban on same-gender marriage. The U.S. District court held that the ban was
unconstitutional. The state appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, who
ruled in June, 2014, that the ban violates the U.S. Constitution’s guarantees on
equal protection and due process. In October, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to hear a review of the Appeals Court decision.
49. Id.
50. Costanza v. Caldwell, supra note 40, at 21.
51. Id. at 20.
52. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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any doctrine of ‘separate but equal.’ 53
In comparing Brown v. Board of Education to Costanza v.
Caldwell, Judge Rubin brilliantly links the deprivation of equal
protection experienced by homosexual couples to the same
deprivations of dignity experienced by racial minorities during the
civil rights era; a moral evil deeply rooted in our nation’s history.
Judge Rubin likewise dismisses the notion, relied upon by
Judge Feldman, that widespread democratic consensus is required
before adopting such social change. Notwithstanding the approval
of Louisiana voters to ban same-gender marriages and civil unions
in 2004, 54 “It is the opinion of this court that widespread social
consensus leading to acceptance of same-gender marriage is
already in progress. The moral disapproval of same-gender
marriage is not the same as it was when Louisiana first defined
marriage as a union between one man and a woman.” 55 Further,
and more importantly, public consensus does not guarantee that
public policy comports with the rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution.
IV. BASKIN V. BOGAN: SARDONICISM IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, in Baskin v. Bogan
(2014), 56 Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit rendered an
opinion providing that Wisconsin and Indiana have “no reasonable
basis” for forbidding same-gender marriage. 57 In Judge Posner’s
opinion, there is no question that homosexuals constitute a suspect
class of persons. Tantamount to the line of reasoning employed by
Judge Rubin, same-gender couples constitute a group of persons
with an immutable characteristic who have historically faced
discrimination. “It was tradition to not allow blacks and whites to
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Costanza v. Caldwell, supra note 40, at 19.
La. Const. Art. XII, § 15.
Costanza v. Caldwell, supra note 40, at 19.
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id.
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marry—a tradition that got swept away,” Posner says. “Prohibition
of same-gender marriage is [rooted in] a tradition of hate ... and
savage discrimination.” 58
To achieve a ruling that firmly provides for marriage equality,
Judge Posner recognizes that federal judges in other circuits may
have revised the constitutional framework for marriage by either
requiring heightened judicial scrutiny or declaring same-gender
marriage a fundamental right. Posner, however, is not interested in
reformulating the constitutional framework. Rather, he seeks to
emphasize the constitutionally offensive nature of the state
statutes. In doing so, he underscores that such statutes offend the
Constitution under any interpretation of the equal protection
clause, regardless of the level of judicial scrutiny.
Although unnecessary, Judge Posner performs a review of “the
leading scientific theories” about homosexuality to illustrate that
being homosexual is not a choice, an opinion held by notable
jurists, including Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Martin
Feldman. 59 The review, however, reinforces Posner’s analytical
framework that a suspect class may not be constitutionally
disadvantaged without a rational basis. Even at such a low
threshold, he condemns the viability of prohibitions against samegender marriage.
During oral arguments in Baskin v. Bogan, 60 the recurring
theme of the state’s arguments included “responsible procreation.”
In summarizing and dismissing the states’ arguments, Judge
Posner exclaims:
[The] government thinks that straight couples tend to be
sexually irresponsible, producing unwanted children by the
carload, and so must be pressured (in the form of
government encouragement of marriage through a
combination of sticks and carrots) to marry, but that gay
couples, unable as they are to produce children wanted or
58. Oral Argument, Judge Posner, Baskin v. Bogan, id.
59. Baskin v. Bogan, supra note 56, at 657.
60. Id. at 648.

260

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

unwanted, are model parents—model citizens really—so
have no need for marriage. 61
“Heterosexuals,” Judge Posner responds, “get drunk and
pregnant, producing unwanted children; their reward is to be
allowed to marry. Homosexual couples do not produce unwanted
children; their reward is to be denied the right to marry. Go
figure.” 62
Despite the entertaining and amusing juxtaposition of Judge
Posner’s opinion, in more serious terms, Posner describes the case
as being one “at a deeper level,” about “the welfare of American
children.” The mere fact that gay couples in America are raising
more than hundred thousand children suggests a compelling
interest in support of gay marriage, since actively banning it,
demonstrably harms children. During oral arguments, Judge
Posner frequently interrupts Indiana Solicitor General Thomas
Fischer, just moments into his presentation to outline a number of
psychological strains endured by the children of unmarried
couples, including the struggle to understand “[W]hy their
schoolmates’ parents are married, yet theirs are [not].” 63 “What
horrible stuff,” Posner says. 64 In describing the harmful effects on
children, Posner comprehensively contributes to the vivid imagery
of their victimization.
Assuming that same-gender couples constitute a suspect class,
Judge Posner recognizes that a law that harms such a class may be
constitutional if it has offsetting benefits. Judge Posner,
recognizing this possibility, then asks what group of persons could
possibly benefit from a ban on same-gender marriage. Quoting
John Stuart Mill, Posner writes,
To be the basis of legal or moral concern . . . the harm must
be tangible, secular, material—physical or financial, or, if
emotional, focused and direct—rather than moral or
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 662.
Id.
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spiritual. . . . [W]hile many heterosexuals (though in
America a rapidly diminishing number) disapprove of
same-gender marriage, there is no way they are going to be
hurt by it in a way that the law would take cognizance of.
Wisconsin doesn’t argue otherwise. Many people strongly
disapproved of interracial marriage, and, more to the point,
many people strongly disapproved (and still strongly
disapprove) of homosexual sex, yet Loving v. Virginia 65
invalidated state laws banning interracial marriage, and
Lawrence v. Texas 66 invalidated state laws banning
homosexual sex acts.67
“There is simply no harm,” Posner writes, “tangible, secular,
material—physical or financial, or … focused and direct done to
anybody by permitting gay marriage. Conservative Christians may
be offended, but there is no way they are going to be hurt by it in a
way that the law would take cognizance of.” A lot of people, after
all, objected to interracial marriage in 1967—but that didn’t stop
the court from invalidating anti-miscegenation laws in Loving v.
Virginia. 68
In his opinion, Judge Posner makes his points with sardonic
humor, but he emphasizes the profound harm that marriage bans
inflict on same-gender couples and their families. In humanizing
the parties central to his opinion, Judge Posner “restores the equal
protection clause to its rightful place as the safeguard for all whom
the state seeks to harm unjustly.” 69 In the words of Mark Joseph
Stern, a constitutional law blogger for Slate Magazine:
Posner does not sound like a man aiming to have his words
etched in the history books or praised by future generations.
Rather, he sounds like a man who has listened to all the
arguments against gay marriage, analyzed them cautiously
and thoroughly, and found himself absolutely disgusted by
65. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
66. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
67. Baskin v. Bogan, supra note 56, at 670.
68. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
69. Mark Joseph Stern, Judge Posner’s Gay Marriage Opinion Is a Witty,
Deeply Moral Masterpiece (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
outward/2014/09/05/judge_richard_posner_s_gay_marriage_opinion_is_witty_
moral_and_brilliant.html.
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their sophistry and rank bigotry. The opinion is a
masterpiece of wit and logic that doesn’t call attention to—
indeed, doesn’t seem to care about—its own brilliance.
Posner is not writing for Justice Anthony Kennedy, or for
judges of the future, or even for gay people of the present.
He is writing, very clearly, for himself. 70
V. CONCLUSION
Human sympathy and compassion are vital in the work of the
Court. Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s vision focuses upon human
details and on the problems, worries, and predicaments of
individuals. This has been the hallmark of his vision of
constitutional law and his interaction with the world around him. 71
This practical yet compassionate view adds to the scope of the
Court’s work and its angle of vision. Where political discourse
surrounding same-gender marriage has become muddled by
religion, morality, public policy, and personal prejudice, the legal
treatment of same-gender marriage under a sympathetic reading of
the Due Process Clause holds the potential to provide a more direct
path to the legalization of same-gender marriage. We must never
forget, “Compassion need not be exiled from the province of
judging.” 72

70. Id.
71. Paul R. Baier, Mr. Justice Blackmun: Reflections from the Cours
Mirabeau, 59 LA. L. REV. (1999).
72. Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Services, supra note 5, at
213.

